Cybersecurity
Ransomware in the Office: Lessons from the 2024 National Data Center Incident
The Brain Cipher ransomware attack on Temporary National Data Center 2 in June 2024 paralyzed the services of hundreds of agencies. Its lessons apply to any company that keeps important data in one place.
SEO and Content Specialist
4 min read Reviewed by Legia Cybersecurity Team
Short answer: the ransomware incident at Temporary National Data Center 2 (PDNS 2) in June 2024 disrupted the services of 239 government agencies. According to BSSN, only about 2% of the data there had a backup at another location, because use of the backup facility was optional. The biggest lesson for companies: separate, tested backups determine whether an attack ends as a few hours of disruption or permanent data loss.
This article summarizes public information from news reports and official statements at the time. Its purpose is to draw lessons for companies, not to judge any particular party.
What happened
According to a statement from the Ministry of Communication and Informatics quoted by Antara (June 27, 2024), the first disruption was detected on June 17, 2024, and malicious activity began on June 20, 2024 at 00:54 WIB, including attempts to disable the Windows Defender security feature. The ransomware used was called Brain Cipher, a new variant of LockBit 3.0, and the attackers demanded a ransom of US$8 million.
The impact was wide: 239 agencies were affected, made up of 30 ministries and institutions, 15 provinces, 148 regencies, and 48 cities. Another 43 agencies that only kept backups in PDNS 2 were not directly affected. In a hearing with Commission I of the DPR on June 27, 2024, the head of BSSN said the main problems were governance and the lack of backups: only about 2% of PDNS 2 data was backed up at PDNS Batam.
Five lessons for companies
1. Backups must be separate, not just exist
Modern ransomware tries to encrypt or delete backups that can be reached from the same network. Safe backups are stored in a separate location, and at least one copy cannot be changed or deleted from the main system. A commonly used pattern is 3-2-1: three copies of the data, on two different media, with one copy offsite.
2. Backups that are never tested may not be recoverable
Many companies only learn that their backups are corrupted, incomplete, or take days to restore during the incident itself. Test recovery periodically: pick one system, restore it from backup to a separate environment, and record how long it takes.
3. Optional choices tend not to be used
One reason PDNS 2 had so few backups is that using them was optional for its users. In companies, the same pattern appears when backups are left to individual divisions or individual applications. Make backup the default policy for important systems, with exceptions that require written approval.
4. Early signs are often visible before encryption
The timeline of the incident shows a gap between the first disruption and the malicious activity, including attempts to disable security software. Monitoring that alerts you when antivirus is switched off, a new admin account is created, or an unusual login occurs gives you time to act before all the data is locked.
5. One place for everything means one point of failure
Centralizing data makes management easier, but it also centralizes risk. If one data center hosts many important services, its resilience must be designed to match: network segmentation, restricted admin access, separate backups, and a recovery plan for each service.
Why these lessons apply to private companies
PDNS 2 is far larger than most companies, but the pattern of problems is the same as what is often found in an ordinary office: a file server that is the only place holding important data, backups stored on the same network, admin accounts shared among several people, and security software that no one monitors. Ransomware does not choose victims by size; it exploits the same weaknesses wherever they are.
For a company, the impact is also layered. Besides operations stopping, if customers’ or employees’ personal data is affected, the Personal Data Protection Law requires written notification within 3 x 24 hours to data subjects and the authority. That obligation is much easier to meet if the company knows what data is stored where.
Questions to check in your company
- Where are the backups of your most important systems stored, and can they be reached from the office network?
- When was recovery from backup last tested, and how long did it take?
- Who receives an alert when security software is switched off?
- How many accounts have admin rights, and are they all still needed?
- Is there a written plan for who does what in the first hours of an incident?
Where to start
The most accessible step usually begins with knowing the gaps that exist. A vulnerability check finds software that is not updated, default configurations, and services exposed without need, which are often the entry point of an attack. At Legia, Vulnerability Assessment examines websites, applications, servers, and cloud, with a report prioritized by level and monthly periodic checks. On the backup side, server installation under the Server Installation & Management service includes backups that are tested at setup. Other security services are on the Cyber Security page.
Frequently asked questions
Does paying the ransom guarantee the data comes back?
There is no guarantee. Paying also does not close the gap the attackers used. Agencies such as CISA advise against paying the ransom and focusing effort on recovery from backups.
Are small companies also targets of ransomware?
Yes. Many attacks are opportunistic: attackers look for weak systems, not specific companies. A company’s size does not make it safe.
What is the first step when an office is hit by ransomware?
Isolate the affected devices from the network, do not rush to shut them down because traces in memory are useful for analysis, disconnect backup media, then contact the person in charge by phone, not by office email.
Sources
- Antara, Menkominfo jelaskan kronologi serangan siber PDNS 2 (June 27, 2024)kalsel.antaranews.com
- Bisnis.com, BSSN sebut hanya 2% data PDNS Surabaya yang terbackup di Batam (June 27, 2024)teknologi.bisnis.com
- CNBC Indonesia, Alasan backup Pusat Data Nasional hanya 2% (June 28, 2024)cnbcindonesia.com
- CISA, #StopRansomware Guidecisa.gov


